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An interesting feature of the 2020 COVID pandemic so far1 has been how a large proportion 
of the population of democratic societies have been more or less willing to accept sometimes 
quite severe restrictions of their liberty and substantial hits to GDP.  It is almost as if millions 
and millions of people actually do think that their health and wellbeing, and that of their 
family, friends, and of wider society, is more important than maximising economic activity 
and the space for libertarian consumption2. This has not been the case universally, of course. 
Still, although there have been plenty of cases of apparent government indifference, 
incoherence and competence-bypass, democratic populations have tended to support 
government claims to be ‘following the science’ and the health care institutions charged with 
delivering the results of that science. It seems a good time to be ask whether there might be 
similar mass support for environmental measures that, whilst not amounting to a ‘full 
lockdown’, might follow the relevant sciences in bringing about a more ecologically rational 
and just ‘new normal’. This question brings many further questions in its wake, some of 
which are considered by the papers in this issue of Environmental Values3.  
In the first paper William Davies considers how the current ecological moment might allow a 
‘green populism’, very different to that of a Trump or Bolsonaro (Davies 2020).  He draws 
upon the work of Hannah Arendt, ‘for whom the tension between science and politics is 
central to the identity of both’ (p.x), to sketch a ‘populism for the Anthropocene’ that strips 
science of its ‘unworldliness’, bringing it within the realm of politics. On this view, the 
Cartesian rationalism Weber associated with the ‘vocation’ of modern science (the ‘value-
free’ search for disembodied, timeless laws governing a nature devoid of ethical significance 
and held to be ontologically distinct from humanity) involves a retreat from politics as a 
realm where actors are only too aware of their finitude and mortality (legendary deeds being 
the only route to anything like immortality).  Gripped by a vocational commitment to 
objectivity and value freedom, scientists qua scientists are oddly oblivious to the 
consequences of their endeavours, blind to the value of the preconditions of human life (and 
so of the scientific enterprise itself), and silent on political questions regarding the 
organisation, governance and funding of science. The (self-)image of modern science as 
 
1 This was written in August 2020. 
2 See Spash (2020) for a discussion of how the pandemic has further exposed the structural irrationalities and 
injustices of ‘economic systems dominated by a capital accumulating growth imperative’ that have long been 
criticised in terms of their limits, ‘consumerist values and divorce from biophysical realities’.  
3 All of which were submitted, reviewed and accepted prior to the 2020 pandemic. 
‘pure’ apolitical pursuit of objective truth has received severe blows from genealogical and 
social studies of science. Work has also been done on the psychological difficulties of 
holding onto the Weberian ideal qua scientist in fields like climate science where findings are 
particularly alarming from most value perspectives4.  The question now is how to 
reconceptualise science to engage with the political and ethical issues wrapped up in the 
ecological crisis5. Although Arendt could hardly be described as a populist, Davies shows 
that her critique of unworldly modern science chimes with key elements of populism.  
Central to populism is a picture of ‘the people’ whose ‘general will’ is thwarted by a corrupt 
elite. Both sides of this distinction tend to be homogenised.  Differences amongst the people 
are downplayed or ignored, precisely to produce a picture of a mass with something like a 
general will.  Differences between apparently distinct centres of power and authority 
(including political parties, the media, senior civil servants, universities, the judiciary and 
business leaders) are erased to produce a picture of a minority elite cultural group of decision 
makers all ‘in it together’ in thwarting the people, behind the smokescreen afforded by liberal 
democratic institutions6.  Important here is populist critique of the pretence to representation 
(only direct democracy topped off by charismatic leadership can genuinely articulate the will 
of the people), including elite expert representation of the ‘objective facts’. Here is where the 
populist picture tends to coincide with the critique of an ‘unworldly’ science. In reality, as 
part of the elite it interprets and presents the facts in ways serving the interests of that elite7.  
For Davies, this chimes with an important Arendtian insight: perception of hypocrisy has 
often been a more potent mobiliser of political action (of transforming engages into enrages) 
than perception of injustice. However, he suggests that with some modification of the 
scientific vocation another form of populism is possible, one deeply informed by the science 
and focussed on environmental problems. Signs of this have already been seen in the 
development of movements such as Extinction Rebellion and Rising Tide.   
One area of science that seems to avoid the problem of unworldliness is medical science, 
Davies argues. This is more generally trusted (not universally: consider anti-vaxxers for 
 
4 See for example Hoggett & Randall (2018).  
5 Davies’ frame is the Anthropocene: ‘the riddle that the Anthropocene poses is that the human and non-human 
worlds are no longer ontologically distinct…and yet it is modern science that has established this... Science must 
abandon its claim to be politically autonomous without this generating a wholesale legitimacy crisis for 
scientific expertise of the sort that many populists seek to exploit’ (p.x). Perhaps more weight could be given to 
the point that ‘the Anthropocene’ itself is not a natural kind whose existence simply confronts us a fact to be 
accepted. It is a highly homogenising and contestable social/political construction (see, for example, Tait 2019). 
6 For a recent overview of the large literature connecting ecological issues with different understandings of 
democracy, see Schlosberg et al (2019).  
7 There are more or less sophisticated and nuanced versions of this thought, of course. 
example). His Arendtian explanation of this is the obvious focus of medicine on care for 
mortal, vulnerable bodies ‘in the sphere of action where human beings appear before one 
another as unique and irreplaceable’ (p.x). Although also obviously reliant on understanding 
the human body as a material object obeying scientific principles, medicine is animated by an 
explicitly value-laden therapeutic culture of care quite unlike the Weberian scientific 
vocation, from the perspective of which suffering and death are meaningless. The suggestion 
is that care for all living beings, including nonhuman beings, might become a central focus 
for populist political concern, with the relevant kinds of expertise ‘modelled on the ideal type 
of the nurse’ as much as  that of the ‘classically modern scientist’ (p.x). The project would be 
one of constructing a shared political world in which the life, death and action of humans and 
nonhumans are granted recognition and meaning, rather than subsumed under general laws to 
enable their techno-scientific administration. To signal the sense of urgency associated both 
with populism in general and the environmental situation in particular, Davies suggests the 
mobilising cry: ‘Stop, you’re killing everything!’ (p.x). 
There is more to Davies’ analysis and argument than I can mention here and, as he 
acknowledges, his paper raises many unanswered questions. One concerns the science policy 
appropriate to such a green populism. Another concerns the values driving it: what do those 
motivated to forms of green activism actually value and what should they value? Presumably 
this shouldn’t be a matter only of legislation by elite ethical experts. Nor should we expect 
‘care for human and nonhuman life’ to be a label for a monolithic value perspective shared by 
a homogenous ‘green mass’.  
In the second paper of this issue Heather Alberro reflects on qualitative empirical research 
into the views of radical environmental activists (REAs), specifically members of Earth 
First!, Sea Shepherd and the German Hambacher Forst occupation. Her discussion reinforces 
the expectation that even assuming a populist care orientation moves beyond simple 
anthropocentrism, the value perspectives involved, and philosophical underpinnings, will 
remain diverse. Alberro also provides evidence to the effect that when deeply felt care is 
confronted with the violence, loss and destruction entailed by anthropogenic mass extinction 
and climate change it can move via grief and despair into a misanthropic reversal of 
traditional human/nonhuman hierarchies.  
Alberro analyses the views she encounters in terms of how they express the ‘post-
anthropocentric paradigm shift’ seemingly required by the ecological crisis. Adding to the 
literature on the influence of deep ecology and social ecology on REAs she is concerned to 
investigate the nuances of their views, for example in the extent of their commitment to 
biocentrism, sentientism, or to valuing others in proportion to their similarity to humans. 
‘Would they extend the same value and consideration, for example, to a red tide algae bloom 
as they would a humpback whale?’ (p.x).  She uses post-anthropocentric, or posthumanist, 
scholarship to assess their views on such matters. ‘Posthumanism’ here is not the position 
associated with biogenetic human enhancement; it refers to the rejection of central features of 
traditional humanism: a view of humans as the centre of the world and of their superiority to 
all others as grounding a right to reduce them to objects to be subdued and exploited. Alberro 
reports that many REAs embrace such posthumanism whilst also exhibiting ‘lingering traces 
of hierarchical valuation’ in uneasy tension with views of the equal inherent value of all life. 
Partly this is because of an ambivalently expressed view of perceived sentience or 
intelligence as grounding ethical status (the ambivalence often concerning how far such 
attributes extend). This is in some tension with posthumanism because it involves the 
‘problematic othering’ of beings perceived to lack these favoured characteristics, such that in 
effect the worth of beings is assessed in terms of similarity to humanity. On the other hand, 
many also express a commitment to biocentrism but with some ambiguity and disagreement 
about what counts as ‘life’, and some willingness to value inorganic matter in a way with 
some affinity to theories such as vital materialism. However, Alberro also reports some 
hierarchical evaluation in terms of perceived ecological roles or significance. It is in this 
context that some misanthropic hierarchy-inversion emerges. Some REAs note that unlike 
many species (e.g., photo-synthesisers, keystone species and pollinators) humanity is not 
required for the sustained viability of life; that we are wholly dependent on a vast number of 
other species, but also the Earth would likely benefit from our disappearance or a large 
decrease in our numbers.   
Despite such nuances and disagreements, Alberro emphasises that many REAs sought to 
deconstruct hierarchical and dualistic classifications and emphasise the ontological 
inaccuracy of the myth of hyper-separation of human and nonhuman beings. They ‘gesture 
towards potentially more ethical ways of relating to Earth others’, and especially ‘noteworthy 
are the depths of REA kinship bonds with other species and the natural world, which compel 
them “into spaces of absolute sacrifice” in order to ensure the continuity of the latter’ (p.x). 
Perhaps then they can be regarded as performers of great deeds in the vanguard of a green 
populism. If so then the potential movement from deeply internalised care for Earth others 
through grief at their destruction to misanthropy is itself something to give careful 
consideration. 
In the third paper, Karin Edvardsson Björnberg, Helena Röcklinsberg and Per Sandin 
consider views that are in some ways the polar opposite of REAs’: those of the ‘Cornwallists’ 
(Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation), an American Christian conservative 
group influential in the opposition to greenhouse gas emissions reductions (Björnberg et al., 
2020)8.  They consider several overlapping Cornwallist scripture-based arguments in order to 
assess the extent these are science-denying or rest on premises rejected by science. Climate 
denialism comes in several forms (denial of: significant warming; the anthropogenic origin of 
whatever warming there is; the negative impact on humans and the environment of any such 
warming; and of any legitimate scientific consensus on climate change). Some Cornwallist 
arguments are clearly denialist. For example, they run a form of cost/benefit argument (the 
economic costs of emissions reduction vastly outweighs the benefits and so shouldn’t be 
accept by Christians), and lack of moral relevance argument (there are far more pressing 
problems for the genuine Christian to focus upon: poverty, abortion, gay marriage, human 
trafficking…). These entail denial of the scientific consensus on the enormity of the harms 
associated with climate change including their relationship to poverty and other social ills. 
However, Björnberg et al also suggest that some Cornwallist arguments do not deny the 
science as such, so much as rest on premises refuting the relevance of science. For example, 
although the ‘omnipotence argument’ (as the divine creation of Almighty God the Earth can 
cope with some climate change even if there is some temporary instability) could be read as 
denying scientific accounts of the impact of climate change, science cannot rule out the 
possibility of divine intervention to remedy the situation. This may be a case of subordinating 
science to faith, rather than denying it outright. Thus Björnberg and her colleagues introduce 
a new category of denial: ‘relevance denial’.  This is most clearly observed in another 
argument, one based on ‘anti-paganism’: making the environment, including the climate, the 
focus of major concern ‘serves the creature rather than the creator’ (p.x). It conflates 
transcendent God with His created natural order. We are supposed to be wise stewards of this 
creation but caring very deeply about it is a step too far that transforms wise stewardship into 
‘pagan nature-worship’.  This is in stark opposition to the care for  nature orientation that 
 
8 As Björnberg et al emphasise, the Cornwallists are very far from representative of all Christian, including 
conservative Christian, views on these matters. For further recent discussion of the relation between religious 
commitments and environmental issues see, for example, Glaab and Fuchs (2018), Uzzell and Räthzell (2019), 
Wrenn (2019). 
Davies hopes might motivate a green populism, of course, as well as the anti-dualist, anti-
hierarchical attitudes Alberro finds amongst REAs.  Björnberg et al do emphasise that not all 
Christian evangelists regard climate change mitigation for nature’s sake as crossing the 
Rubicon from wise stewardship to paganism, and that one might hope some of those inclined 
to take Cornwallist arguments seriously may yet see climate change mitigation as justified. 
Even so, the ‘stewardship but not more’ orientation of such views places them at profound 
odds with those seeking to overcome dualism and hierarchy to care for all living things. This 
is a clash between what Mary Midgley called ‘background myths’ regarding our place in the 
world (Midgley 2003), rather than a difference in scientific methodology or disagreement 
over this or that empirical fact. The clash is further extended and complicated when one takes 
on board the point, also emphasised by Björnberg et al, that the Cornwallist arguments have 
secular, anthropocentric analogues.   
Christian conservatives are of the right, but that does not make them fascists of course. Still 
there is a contrast to be drawn between right-wing ideology and the kind of green populism 
described by Davies, which it is fair to say is of the left. One might wonder though whether 
any such populism can resist tendencies, often associated with populism, to ‘lurch to the 
right’ via appeals to strong forms of nationalism and hostility to immigrants and outsiders and 
the treacherous elites who favour them over ‘the people’. It would be good then to have a 
clear view of the ideas constituting ideologies lurking on the far right, especially as they bear 
upon environmentalism. Balša Lubarda’s paper, the fourth in this issue, does valuable work 
in this regard (Lubarda 2020). His aim is to provide a coherent framework for empirical 
inquiry into the area, the first move being to reject ‘eco-fascism’ as an inadequate umbrella 
term with which to make sense of the range of ideas at play.  Instead we should think in terms 
of ‘far right ecologism’ (FRE) as an ideal type composed of core ideas that are modified by 
adjacent ideas within conservative and other right-wing traditions. The ideas are dynamic, in 
a flux of mutual modification contingent on place and history.  We should not be thinking of 
a fixed, monolithic FRE (presumably this is true of all ideologies). Lubarda argues that the 
three core components of FRE are: ‘naturalism’ (in the sense of regarding nature as a 
blueprint for society, or the nation as a continuation of natural law, and from which non-
nationals, including invasive and exotic species, need to be excluded, and ‘natural borders’ 
protected); ‘spirituality and mysticism’ (for example, in Christian countries some form of 
stewardship of, and conformity to, God’s divine creation; but in general, for the far right, 
‘environmental degradation is a symptom of a “spiritual deficit” induced by modern 
“ideologies of progress”’ (p.x)); ‘organicism’ (in the sense of regarding human communities 
as ‘forming a common ecosystem or biome with other organic and inorganic elements, from 
which kinship ties with other creatures are inferred’ (p.x)).  The ‘adjacent’ ideas that modify 
these core FRE notions include populist radical right anthropocentric interpretations of the 
national importance of local nature or landscape or, on the other hand, extreme veneration of 
the ‘power and authority’ of nature compared to the puniness of the state. These can produce 
variations in the kinds of ‘naturalism’ in play, for example. Organicism can often be coloured 
by economic autarkist notions emphasising the self-dependence and profound connection 
between ‘land and man’ of those ‘rooted in the soil’, as opposed to nomads and 
cosmopolitans. Lubarda illustrates his discussion of these clusters of ideas, and their 
relations, with historical and contemporary examples9.  
Taken together the first four papers cover many ideas and raise many questions.  One 
question is whether all of the ideas should be (allowed to be) raised, at least in public 
discourse. A common (populist?) complaint at the moment is that a pernicious ‘cancel 
culture’ has developed in democratic societies in which ‘snowflakes’ seek to silence voices 
that challenge or upset them.  Actually, the legal/constitutional protections in place to 
safeguard free speech within democratic societies tend to be robust and permissive. Are they 
too permissive though – given the current eco-political moment? In the final paper of the 
issue Hodgetts and McGravey (2020) consider this question, specifically in relation to 
climate change denial.  
Against the background of recent research showing that 32% of registered voters in the USA 
believe that climate change either is not happening or is not anthropogenic, Hodgetts and 
McGravey consider the case for restricting the expression of climate change denial. Their 
focus is the constitutional and jurisprudential position in the USA, but their argument is 
generalisable to other democracies. They argue the case is compelling with respect to 
‘professional deniers’. These are the ‘merchants of doubt’ paid, by industry or dark money, to 
purposefully propagate ‘known falsehoods in order to sow doubt into public knowledge, 
manipulate public sentiments and/or influence government policy’ (p.x). The contrast is with 
‘private sceptics’ who, however motivated, express their scepticism as private citizens, albeit 
in public spaces such as town hall meetings or universities. Why should professional denial 
be allowed? The current permissive position rests on two main arguments. One takes its cue 
 
9 See also Katz (2014) for a useful discussion of similarities (and – crucially – dissimilarities) between forms of 
ecological restoration and Nazi nativism and ideas of ‘Blood and Soil’.  
from John Stuart Mill (2005): given the huge utility over time of the pursuit of truth via 
unrestricted debate within a ‘marketplace of ideas’, speech should be restricted only when it 
threatens to result in immediate physical harm. The other argument is that, regardless of the 
pursuit of truth, genuine democratic debate in which all voices are heard requires the fullest 
protection of free speech. Neither argument is convincing in the case of professional climate 
denial, Hodgetts and McGravey argue. The Millian argument ignores how immediately 
pressing are the harms of climate change and how they will intensify the longer it takes to 
implement significant mitigation policies. There is no time to run an experiment to see which 
ideas thrive in a ‘free market’, especially one including well-resourced parties intentionally 
distorting or denying scientifically established facts in order to prevent or delay mitigation. 
The democracy argument similarly fails because genuine democratic debate presupposes an 
informed citizenry rather than an intentionally deceived citizenry. However, Hodgetts and 
McGravey do not advocate constitutional revolution or wholesale abandonment of the norms 
of free speech. They propose a ‘categorical exception’ be made for professional denialism 
within an overall system permissive of free speech. Without equating professional denialism 
with such practices they point to analogies with restricting obscenity and child pornography 
within a generally permissive system: in the latter case the harm to the child does not occur 
only when the images are made, but is multiplied over time through reproduction of the 
images; and ‘climate change denial creates a harm that multiplies through time for the youth 
who are unable to sufficiently combat the problem today’ (p.x). 
Could this have popular support? One might think the framing of the issue in terms of the 
proper scope of a neutral marketplace of ideas is itself objectionable. Maybe the notion of 
such a marketplace as in itself neutral between competing truth claims should be regarded as 
a hypocritical smokescreen behind which to enforce partisan views. If denialists claimed this 
might they have a point if Davies’ Arendtian analysis in the first paper is along the right 
lines? Not really. Professional denialist appeal to free speech relies on the ‘marketplace’ 
neutrality associated with science as an epistemic enterprise aimed at the truth yet wants 
knowingly to deny or obfuscate the findings of that enterprise regarding climate change. This 
looks like hypocrisy. If we put aside the impartial pursuit of truth and instead justify free 
speech in terms of its importance either for human flourishing10 or the functioning of 
democracy, then it is hard to see why intentionally denying scientific findings regarding 
serious threats to flourishing, and to the social, economic and ecological stability conditions 
 
10 As Mill also did (2005, ch.2). 
of democracy, should be protected. The claim that it should be looks like a hypocrisy worse 
than injustice.  
Science has faced a steep learning curve with regard to COVID and much remains unclear, 
despite the international biomedical mobilisation. The basic elements of climate change have 
been established, and professionally denied, for decades. Given the speed with which at least 
many governments following the science regarding COVID introduced dramatic measures 
with general popular support it seems unlikely that they would put up for long with 
professional denial generously funded by the interests threatened by policies recommended to 
protect the public in a time of pandemic.  Maybe a crucial difference is simply the speed with 
which COVID appeared and spread worldwide: there was no time for professional denialism 
to organise (like most governments they were unprepared, despite previous warnings). 
Although with us now and accelerating, climate change and the  scientific consensus 
regarding it took longer; long enough for professional denialism to develop a powerful hold. 
All the same, we are all supposed to be following the science now and we are entitled to 
request this will be done consistently, with appropriate urgency and a view to engaging with 
the large issues of value, meaning, ethics and justice. 
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